Traceability in Meat Supply Chains by Hobbs, Jill E.
Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 37
already contracted a foodborne illness, knowing where the problem originated is of no
direct value to him or her. Thus, quality assurances with respect to specific credence
attributes, bundled with traceability, have more appeal. An identity preservation system,
featuring traceability, may be necessary to facilitate the provision of ex ante quality
assurances in the meat sector. Paradoxically it appears that the Canadian food industry
could do more to engender higher levels of consumer confidence with respect to the
credibility of private sector quality assurances about production and processing practices.
Economic Incentives for Traceability
Food safety and quality together comprise one of the five pillars of the ongoing
Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) discussions between the federal, provincial and
territorial governments in Canada. Traceability of food products features in this strategy,
with a target of 80 percent of domestic food at the retail counter to be traceable through
the agri-food continuum (AAFC, 2002). One industry initiative to facilitate traceability in
the livestock sector is the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency (CCIA) established by
the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association. The CCIA has implemented a mandatory national
cattle identification system to allow the traceback of cattle in the event of a food safety or
animal disease problem. Given the interest in traceability in both the public sector and the
Canadian livestock sector, it is pertinent to consider the economic incentives for
introducing a traceability system. There are three main functions of a traceability system:
(i) facilitating the traceback of products to reduce the costs associated with or minimize
the risks of a food safety problem; (ii) strengthening liability incentives; and (iii) allowing
ex ante verification of credence quality attributes.
Traceback as a Cost Reduction Strategy
The primary economic incentive for many private sector and most regulatory traceability
initiatives is to facilitate the traceback of products or animals in the event of a food safety
problem. This is a risk reduction strategy designed to reduce the ex post costs of a food
safety incident or an outbreak of an animal disease such as foot-and-mouth disease.
Potential private sector cost savings include reduction of product recall costs through
more targeted recalls, protection of market share through the maintenance of
consumer/buyer confidence, and protection from free riders of firms that do practise due
diligence in their food safety procedures, through the ability to demonstrate that a problem
is isolated to a small segment of the industry. Enhanced traceability may reduce the public
costs associated with a foodborne disease if the scope of an outbreak can be limited,
thereby reducing the medical costs, productivity losses and psychological costs (pain and
suffering) that arise from a widespread foodborne illness.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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Strengthening Liability Incentives
Improved traceability would allow more accurate identification and isolation of the source
of a food safety problem. Legal liability could then be more easily established, enhancing
the effectiveness of tort liability law as an incentive for firms to practise due diligence.
Ceteris paribus, if traceability increases the probability of being found liable for a food
safety problem that can be traced to poor production or food handling practices at a
particular facility or business, then we would expect the overall level of food safety to
improve. Traceability can act as a disciplinary mechanism on the marketplace when
combined with effective and enforceable tort liability law. With this incentive in place,
improved traceability could also reduce the transaction costs of downstream food retailers
or processors in monitoring the activities of upstream suppliers and enforcing good
production practices upstream.
Both the liability and risk reduction traceback functions are ex post information
functions – the process of tracing back products yields economic benefits related to food
safety. In contrast, the third function of a traceability system involves ex ante information
provision related to product quality.
Ex ante Verification of Credence Quality Attributes
Traceability has been touted as a means to differentiate products on the basis of credence
quality attributes such as enhanced production practices that promote farm animal
welfare, protect the environment or ensure the absence of genetically modified organisms,
etc. Due to the presence of information asymmetry consumers cannot detect the presence
of a credence attribute; therefore, identity preservation and labelling are necessary to
signal the presence of the attribute. In this context, “traceability” involves the proactive
provision of information on credence attributes and quality verification to reduce
consumer information costs. Rather than simply depending on the ability to trace products
backwards in the event of a problem, this approach requires that information on the
credence attributes accompany the product as it moves forward through the supply chain.
Traceability Systems
A variety of traceability systems exist in livestock industries across different countries;
some of these are private industry initiatives and others are mandated by regulation. Most
livestock traceability systems perform the first function discussed above. They were put in
place in response to the perceived risk reduction benefits of improved traceback in the
event of a food safety problem. Perhaps more by accident than by design they may also
perform the second function of enhancing food safety through stronger liability
incentives. A few livestock traceability systems also perform the third function of ex ante
quality verification for consumers.
The Canadian cattle identification system facilitates ex post cost reduction in the event
of a food safety problem. The system was fully implemented in July 2002 by the CCIA –Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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an industry association. The system mandates identity tagging of all bovine and bison
animals in Canada before they leave the farm of origin, using a system of unique
identification numbers. The ID number is maintained through slaughter until carcass
inspection but not beyond that point. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (federal
government) initiates a traceback procedure in the event of a food safety or herd health
problem. Information on the herd of origin and the last location of the animal preslaughter
is stored on a database maintained by CCIA. This information can be used to track cattle
movements backwards and forwards in the supply chain, relying on voluntary provision of
location information for any intermediary ownership arrangements (CCIA).
The CCIA argues that the cattle identification system was necessary to maintain
consumer confidence and protect market share domestically and internationally (CCIA).
The traceback system is not designed to provide complete traceability through the supply
chain. It only allows direct traceback from the point of carcass slaughter backwards.
Traceback from the retail counter relies on the product recall and internal record keeping
abilities of downstream retailers and processors. These abilities will vary depending on
the effectiveness of the system of barcodes that identify product source and batch number
and the internal record keeping that identifies either the time of processing or the source
of inputs into each batch. The ability to maintain full traceability through a packing plant
presents technological, logistical and economic difficulties for large-scale packers.
Tracking technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, including the potential to use
DNA as part of a traceability system. However, until it becomes clear whether the
economic benefits of full traceability through a packing plant outweigh the costs, partial
traceability linked to batch or lot numbers will remain the dominant system.
National livestock identification systems can also be a platform on which to build
more complex quality assurance programs. Australia has introduced the voluntary
National Livestock Identification System (NLIS) as a joint industry/government initiative.
Cattle are identified using devices imbedded with an electronic microchip. Information on
the chip can be read electronically and is stored on a national database. The system goes
beyond simple identification and allows the storage of information on disease and residue
status of the animal, market eligibility and other commercial information. Cattle producers
can access individual animal information through the database, linking it back to their
own farm records on feed performance, genetics and management techniques (Meat and
Livestock Australia, 2001).
A quality assurance system, including DNA sampling for traceback, piggybacks on
the Australian NLIS. A series of quality management protocols – “Cattle Care” – cover
production, handling and processing. A National Vendor Declaration form identifies the
seller and provides basic production information (e.g., whether the cattle were treated with
a growth-promoting hormone, information about the feeding program, etc.) (Lawrence,
2002). A voluntary grading system, Meat Standards Australia (MSA), uses a series of preCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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and postslaughter measures to predict the eating quality of meat. A blood sample is taken
from each carcass that qualifies for the MSA program while the carcass can still be
identified with a seller. If a consumer complains of a bad eating experience from MSA-
graded meat, a DNA sample from the meat and can be matched with the blood sample
from the carcass. In this way, meat cuts can be traced through the supply chain and to the
farm of origin. Although there is a food safety element, the traceback in the MSA system
is focused primarily on eating quality. It can assist in identifying where improvements
may be necessary or in identifying sellers who consistently misrepresent cattle on their
National Vendor Declaration forms (Lawrence, 2002).
The food retailing sector can also be a catalyst for improved traceability if retailers
determine that it could reduce their risk exposure, improve product recall effectiveness or
reduce the transaction costs of monitoring product quality, including supplier production
methods. The Canadian retailer Sobey’s requires its meat suppliers to demonstrate that
specific production, processing, transportation and handling process have been
implemented. In the UK, supermarkets require their beef suppliers to be members of
accredited on-farm quality assurance programs. This does not necessarily mean that
traceability information is labelled on retail packages for consumers. Traceability back to
the farm may not be an explicit requirement, but it may be a necessary condition for
providing retailers with production and processing quality assurances (Hobbs, 1996;
Bredahl et al., 2001; Fearne, 1998).
Traceability may also be mandated by regulatory initiatives, such as the European
Union beef labelling and traceability regulation. Beef products will be labelled with a
traceability number identifying the origin of the meat, including where the animal was
born, reared, slaughtered and processed. To facilitate the provision of this information
each member state must have a national cattle identification and registration system. The
regulation also introduces rules for voluntary labelling with additional information, such
as production information, animal welfare information, etc. While the EU labelling
regulation requires that a traceability number be included on retail packages, it does not
provide additional quality assurances to consumers. The regulation does not reduce
consumer information asymmetry with respect to credence attributes. Instead it performs
the first of the functions identified earlier, potentially reducing the costs and risks from a
food safety problem by facilitating more accurate traceback and product recall.
To summarize, there are many approaches to enhancing traceability in livestock
sectors. Alternative approaches include industry-wide private sector initiatives versus
individual supply-chain initiatives versus public sector regulation. There may be complete
traceability from the retail package back to the farm production unit or traceability
between specific stages, such as packer to producer. There are systems that provide simple
traceback capability versus those that bundle traceability with additional meat quality or
credence attribute assurances. Whatever the scope or level of complexity of theCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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traceability system, however, the need to be more responsive to consumers is often cited
as the primary reason for implementing traceability systems. For this reason, it is useful to
assess consumer reactions to traceability in meat products, and the extent to which
Canadian consumers value traceability information by itself and combined with other
quality assurances.
Consumers’ WTP for Traceability,
Food Safety and Quality Assurances
Experimental Design and Sample
Experimental auctions were used to evaluate Canadian consumers’ willingness to pay
(WTP) for traceability, food safety and on-farm production information for beef and ham
products.
1 In the absence of publicly available market data on the demand for traceability
and quality verification characteristics, experimental auctions provide a means of eliciting
non-hypothetical bid data for these characteristics. The experimental auctions were
conducted in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan and Guelph, Ontario in 2002. Saskatchewan
participants (106) were recruited from a range of demographic groups at the University of
Saskatchewan (faculty, students, professional administrative staff and maintenance staff).
Ontario participants (98) were recruited from the consumer database of a private
consumer research firm. Auctions were run with ham and beef at both locations, with 104
people participating in the beef auctions and 100 in the ham auctions.
Overall 61 percent of participants were male and 39 percent were female. The
Saskatchewan sample had a higher proportion of males and tended to be younger on
average.
2 There was a range of education levels within the sample, although the higher
education levels tended to be more heavily represented.
3 Relative to the Saskatchewan
group, a higher proportion of Ontario respondents had some college and an undergraduate
degree, whereas a lower proportion had a graduate degree. This is to be expected given
that the Saskatchewan sample was drawn from a university population, albeit from a
broad cross-section of employees and students. Income distribution was broadly similar
across the participants in both provinces, although Saskatchewan had a higher proportion
of respondents in the lower income groups.
4
The experiments were run in groups of 12 to 14 people. Participants were given a beef
(or ham) sandwich as part of a light lunch, and had the opportunity to bid to exchange
their sandwich for a sandwich with additional verifiable characteristics. Four alternative
sandwiches were used in the auction, with different information available for each
sandwich: (i) an animal welfare assurance, (ii) an extra food safety assurance, (iii) meat
that was traceable to the farm of origin, and (iv) a sandwich that combined all three
attributes – extra food safety and animal welfare assurances and meat that was traceable to
the farm. Participants were paid $20 as an incentive for attending the session, which
usually lasted about one hour.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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The auction format followed previous research using experimental auctions to
measure WTP, for example, Shogren et al., (1994). The auction is designed so that the
rational strategy for each participant is to bid his or her true marginal value for the auction
sandwich. In a series of ten rounds, bids were collected for each auction sandwich.
Participants bid the amount (if any) that they would be willing to pay to exchange their
sandwich for each “auction” sandwich. Individual bids were private information, written
down by participants and collected by monitors. At the beginning of each bidding round,
the second highest bid for that sandwich from the previous round was announced.
Conducting multiple rounds of bidding and announcing the “market price” allows for bid
stabilization over the ten rounds and provides a corrective mechanism to assist
participants in understanding the experiment (Shogren et al., 1994; Dickinson and Bailey,
2002).
At the end of the tenth round, a random draw was used to determine which of the
simultaneous sandwich auctions and which round of bidding would be binding. The
highest bidder for the randomly selected sandwich and round paid the second highest bid
price and exchanged his or her sandwich for the auction sandwich. Only one sandwich
was auctioned off in each experiment. There was an equal chance that any of the rounds
of bidding would be binding; thus participants had an incentive to bid honestly each time.
Following the bidding exercise participants completed a short questionnaire, which
collected additional data on individual respondent attitudes toward food safety risks and




Average bid information for each sandwich across the ten rounds is presented in figures 1
and 2. Marginal bid information is presented as a percentage of the base sandwich value
of Cdn $2.82 for the beef sandwich and Cdn $2.85 for the ham sandwich. The base
sandwich value was calculated by asking respondents how much they would typically
expect to pay for the type of sandwich provided to them in the experiment, and averaging
these responses. For both ham and beef, the figures indicate that traceability to the farm of
origin, without additional quality assurances, elicited the lowest average willingness to
pay. Quality verification with respect to credence attributes such as an additional food
safety assurance or an animal welfare assurance elicited higher bids on average. Bundling
traceability information with positive quality assurances yielded the highest bids.
Consistent with results obtained from a similar WTP study with U.S. consumers
(Dickinson and Bailey, 2002), there was a decreasing marginal willingness to pay for the
attributes. Thus, the average bid for the “all inclusive” sandwich was less than the sum of
bids for the individual attributes.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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Some important caveats accompany the interpretation of these bid data. Clearly these
average values mask considerable variations in bids across participants. For example,
there were a high number of zero bids for the “traceability only” sandwich. Due to the
nature of a one-day experiment, the bid information is usually considered to be an upper
bound on WTP (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002; Hayes et al., 1995). Caution should be
exercised in extrapolating these WTP bids into other contexts. Budget constraints
typically limit WTP. Differences in perceived food safety risks across products could also
affect consumers’ WTP for safety assurances depending on the product in question.
Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis of the raw bid data suggests a number of
interesting conclusions. Traceability, by itself, while it may be of interest to some
consumers, does not deliver much value to most people unless it is bundled with quality
assurances with respect to specific credence attributes. Forty-six percent of participants
bid zero for the traceability-only sandwich during the last five rounds of bidding, when
bids can be expected to have stabilized. This compares with only 7 percent bidding zero
on the fourth sandwich, which combined traceability with an extra food safety assurance
and animal welfare assurance. Ex post reactive traceability systems may perform an
important economic function in limiting the costs from a food safety problem and in
maintaining consumer confidence in an industry; however, they do little to reduce
consumer information asymmetry. Traceability may be a necessary but not sufficient
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Figure 1  Average WTP bids – beef. N = 104; base sandwich value = Cdn $ 2.82.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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Credibility of Information Sources
The post-bidding survey questions revealed that Ontario respondents tended to be
more sensitive to food safety issues – a larger proportion having experienced foodborne
illness within their families
5 and a larger proportion having altered their food purchases in
response to media articles about foodborne illness.
6
A higher proportion of Ontario respondents stated that they would “highly value”
additional assurances about meat safety, on-farm production assurances and traceability to
the farm of origin.
7 Participants were asked to indicate which sources they most trusted
and least trusted to provide information about production methods. Possible answers
included various levels of industry: producer associations;
8 processors and retailers;
government: federal
9 and provincial; and third parties: animal welfare or environmental
groups
10 and independent quality assurance firms, or participants could name other
sources. Figures 3 and 4 compare the results for Saskatchewan and Ontario for the most
trusted and least trusted sources respectively.
In both provinces, a federal government agency was the most trusted by participants,
some of whom indicated a belief that the federal government was more likely to protect
the interests of consumers, although the level of trust was higher in Ontario than in
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Figure 2  Average WTP bids – pork. N = 100; base sandwich value = Cdn $ 2.85.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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over 20 percent of respondents in both Ontario and Saskatchewan. There appeared to be
some scepticism of animal welfare or environmental groups (such as Greenpeace or
PETA – People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) among participants in
Saskatchewan (least trusted source for 37 percent of respondents). Results for Ontario
were mixed: 16 percent of respondents listed these groups as their least trusted source, but
11 percent named animal welfare or environmental groups as the most trusted information
source. Some respondents commented that they did not trust these groups as an objective
source of information since they were seen to have an agenda.
Another striking difference is the level of trust of the respective provincial
governments, with 8 percent of Saskatchewan respondents listing the provincial
government as the most credible source of information, whereas 7 percent of Ontario
respondents regarded their provincial government as the least trusted source. One Ontario
participant referred to the budget cutbacks of the Conservative government as the reason
for their distrust. One might also speculate that the lower level of trust could stem from a
loss in confidence in the Ontario provincial government following the outbreak of E. coli
contamination of the municipal water supply in Walkerton in 1999 that resulted in seven
deaths. Without more information, however, it is not possible to provide a clear









































Figure 3  Sources MOST trusted to provide information on production practices.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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Interestingly, downstream food firms did not engender a great deal of trust among the
respondents. Food processors were regarded as the least trusted source of information by
34 percent and 18 percent of Ontario and Saskatchewan respondents respectively, while
food retailers were the least trusted source for about 22 percent of respondents in both
Ontario and Saskatchewan. Comments from some people revealed that these sources were
perceived as having a vested commercial interest that might give them an incentive to
mislead consumers. Paradoxically, these members of the supply chain are in the best
position to communicate directly with consumers, indicating a potential credibility
problem for industry sources in providing traceability and quality assurances. Building
individual branding and product assurances into a nationally accredited identification and
quality verification system, as in the Australian meat industry, could offer a solution.
Conclusions
he development of private sector traceability systems in meat supply chains is
primarily driven by cost reduction and risk reduction motivations. Traceability
systems may also facilitate ex ante quality assurances, but they do not necessarily always
provide consumers with this additional information. Although some Canadian consumers
indicated a willingness to pay for traceability assurance, traceability by itself did not












































Figure 4  Sources LEAST trusted to provide information on production practices.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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assurances with respect to specific credence attributes – food safety and humane animal
treatment – bundled with traceability had more appeal. This suggests that combining
traceability with additional quality assurances with respect to enhanced on-farm
production or processing methods may represent a more viable product differentiation
strategy in the Canadian red meat sector. To be effective as a product differentiation
strategy, however, these quality assurances need to be credible. Participants indicated that
they had relatively higher levels of trust in public sector assurances about production
methods than in those from the private sector. The question of credible quality signals in
the food industry is an important topic for further research.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues J. E. Hobbs
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Endnotes
1 This research was conducted in collaboration with DeeVon Bailey and David Dickinson
from Utah State University, who were conducting experiments in the United States, the
UK, Japan and Canada (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002). Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
funded additional data collection to expand the Canadian portion of the study.
2 Seventy-four percent of Saskatchewan respondents were male, compared with
46 percent in Ontario. In the Saskatchewan sample, 30 percent were aged 18-25,
compared with 8 percent in Ontario, while 6 percent were aged 56-65 compared with
12 percent in Ontario.
3 High school was the highest education level for 24 percent of the sample, whereas
35 percent had some college, 21 percent had an undergraduate degree and 20 percent a
graduate degree.
4 In Saskatchewan, 34 percent reported annual household income as less than $30,000
compared with 17 percent in Ontario. Twenty percent of Saskatchewan respondents had
household incomes of $60,000-$90,000 compared with 33 percent in Ontario. For the
intermediate ($30,000-$60,000) and upper income brackets (over $90,000), the
distribution was very similar in both locations.
5 Forty-eight percent of Ontario participants reported that they themselves or members of
their families had experienced food poisoning, compared with 34 percent in Sask-
atchewan.
6 Respondents were asked whether recent media reports about foodborne illness had
affected their food purchase decisions on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Great effect and
5 = No effect. Ten percent of Ontario respondents indicated that media reports had had a
fairly major effect (scoring 1 or 2), compared with 7 percent in Saskatchewan. Most
people indicated that media reports had not had a major impact on their food purchase
decisions (scoring 4 and 5) – 55 percent in Ontario, compared with 68 percent in
Saskatchewan.
7 The percentages of respondents stating that they would “highly value” this additional
information were 34 percent for additional food safety assurances in Ontario (14 percent
in Saskatchewan), 32 percent for on-farm production assurances in Ontario (22 percent in
Saskatchewan) and 15 percent for traceability in Ontario (8 percent in Saskatchewan).
8 The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association or the Canadian Pork Council, as appropriate,
were given as examples.
9 The Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada were
given as examples.
10 Greenpeace and PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) were given as
examples.